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1. TALKING ON GLOBALIZATION IN GRANADA?
 Summer has not yet arrived in Granada. It is still spring, the season that pre-
cedes summer. However, the end of one season always anticipates the next. That 
is one of the particularities of seasons: they invade each other. One season has 
hardly ended when the next one is on its way.
 I would like to mention “Daybreak in Summer”, a brief text by Federico García 
Lorca. Daybreak in summer, that is, that time of day when “the city lazily sheds 
its veils”, “houses show their faces with empty eyes”, “hazy mists” are glimpsed 
in the distance, “shadows arise and disappear”, and “rushes, reeds and fragrant 
grasses bend over the water to kiss the sun reflected in it”. That instant, in short, 
in which “the Andalusian sun begins to sing the fiery song which all things dread 
to hear”.
 García Lorca also says that Granada is a “paradise closed to many”, because 
the city loves that which is tiny, domestic. Granada is excessively refined, and its 
aesthetics are the aesthetics of tiny things.
 How, then, can we approach globalization in Granada, a city of “leisure”, 
“contemplation”, “without thirst for adventure”, as the poet also described it?
 Nonetheless, where there is leisure and contemplation, there is also “fantasy”, 
another word that is difficult to define. It is a capacity to reproduce past and 
distant things. It is also a faculty for idealizing what is real, that is, to improve 
them, to make them seem better than they actually are. Furthermore, we should 
register another fact about the theme of our Conference: for at least 10 years, the 
“Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez”, under the editorship of Nicolás López 
Calera, has been delivering volumes on economic mondialization (from the French 
mondialisation) and the political and legal crisis, on law in a cosmopolitan de-
mocracy, and on the international economic order and human rights.
 We may not know precisely what globalization consists of and what its outcome 
will be —supposing that such complex processes have an outcome, as such—, it 
is nonetheless real. However, it is also something that we can idealise. I do not 
mean idealise in the sense of changing what we call globalization at will. Rather, 
it is a matter of using our intelligence to raise this process above its own reality 
itself.
 Using one’s intelligence to raise something above reality implies discovering 
a way to improve something. In this case, it means improving globalization rather 
than just letting it unfold before our eyes. It means intervening in its development 
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so that, no matter how disconcerting and uncertain it may be, as many men and 
women as possible will reap its benefits, worldwide. It should not be advantageous 
only for the handful of men and women who live in the four or five best areas of 
the biggest cities in the richest countries on Earth.
 I do not wish to appear over-dramatic, but our current global capitalism seems 
like a huge ocean liner in which a few passengers are comfortably accommodated 
in first-class cabins, while the majority wrap themselves in their blankets as best 
they can, either on deck or in the hold. Not to forget those who swim around the 
ship, desperately trying to climb on board.
 As we all know, seen from the left, globalization has gone through three 
distinct stages: first, it was questioned or directly denied. Next, its existence was 
acknowledged and the anti-globalization banner was raised against it. Now, while 
acknowledging that it is an on-going process, we want to make it different by 
promoting an alter-globalization. It is an entire process that goes from denying 
globalization, opposing it and trying to think up a “different” globalization, that 
is, one that would correct certain negative aspects and ensure, as far as possible, 
better outcomes for the bulk of the world’s population.
2. POETS’ SKEPTICISM AND PHILOSOPHERS’ METAPHORS
 The first time I came to Granada, when no one had yet heard of globalization, 
I brought with me “Juan de Mairena”, a splendid book by another poet, Antonio 
Machado. Mairena, who is none other but Machado himself, on the subject of 
poets and philosophers, says that the latter are poets who believe in the reality of 
their poems. Contrary to generally held opinion, he also affirms that “scepticism 
of poets can act as a stimulus to philosophers, whereas poets can learn the art of 
metaphor from philosophers”.
 Can you perceive a touch of irony towards philosophers in Mairena’s thought? 
He is saying that poets are sceptical, that is, they do not believe the tale, whereas 
philosophers are the builders of metaphor, that is, we believe the tale, or at least, 
we invent tales.
 Finally, Juan de Mairena also says, quite rightly, that in the field of political 
action —which he considers the most superficial and obvious field— only he who 
places the candle in a current of air can be successful, and not he who expects the 
air to blow where he has put the candle. Let us suppose that the air, today’s winds, 
are the winds of globalization, and that philosophy of law is the candle (our candle, 
at least), should we place the philosophy of law in the centre of globalization, so 
it will give a bright enough flame? Or should we place the philosophy of law at 
a certain distance from globalization, even at the risk of making its flame burn 
so low as to shed almost no light at all? 
 Philosophy is not the same as politics. To continue with Machado’s image, it 
would seem that the philosophy of law’s candle should not be where the winds of 
globalization blow because if it were, its flame and its light would only sway to 
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uncontrolled gusts of wind. The philosophy of law should be at a certain distance 
from the globalizing wind because only then can it shed its own light on global-
ization, however weak that light may be.
 Its own light, its feeble light, its infinitesimal light —as tiny as Granada— but 
its own light, nonetheless. Here, light means to take a look and to examine. To take 
a look and to examine or, in other words, theory, in the Greek sense of the word. 
By the way, philosophy and the philosophy of law are not the only disciplines 
that should look at and examine current globalization. All disciplines should do 
so. All of them should do so, not just economy, because its hegemony is as im-
poverishing as any other discipline that intends to explain all human phenomena 
in terms of its language and analytical categories. Can you believe that a Nobel 
Prize winner in Economics was completely serious when he said that Americans 
stopped being adulterers the very day they discovered that it is more expensive 
to support two women than only one? This piece of nonsense is what I mean by 
the impoverishment that could be brought about by a purely economic analysis of 
human behavior and phenomena.
 All disciplines should take a look at and examine globalization, and also take 
a look at each other. It is this collective act of looking (and the lucidity of the 
governing classes, as well as the speed at which they are capable of introducing 
supranational norms adapted to demands) that will make the difference between 
globalization progressing like a rider in control of his steed rather than like a 
runaway horse whose rider hangs on to the reins and stirrups as best he can.
 Globalization raises many issues, but we have nowhere to discuss them. Not 
only do we have nowhere to discuss globalization issues on a regular basis. We 
also lack institutions where, once the issues have been discussed, norms can be 
adopted to regulate globalization. As David Held proposes, in an increasingly global 
world, we need to “share the planet and humanity”, although we must also “share 
rules”. However, as yet we have nowhere where these rules can be legitimately 
adopted.
 Whether we like it or not, as Peter Singer argues, “as the world’s nations 
approach one another to face global issues such as commerce, climate change, 
justice and poverty, our national leaders need to adopt a perspective that goes 
beyond national interest. In other words, they need to gain an ethical perspective 
on globalization”.
 Tough issues require equally tough solutions, although it does not follow 
that simple issues are necessarily simple to solve. Globalization appears to be a 
complicated, rather than a simple matter. Therefore, it requires an attitude that 
is alert, even critical. The challenges posed by globalization, like those that are 
currently being posed by biotechnology, require the preservation and promotion 
of the main characteristic of any philosophy: a critical attitude.
 Philosophy in general, and the philosophy of law, must help us to preserve 
the notion of the complexity of things. At the very least, they should ensure the 
survival of a community of hesitant men and women —the philosophers— who take 
part in the public arena not to reproach others who know nothing —as Socrates 
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did— but to remind them that nothing is as simple as it seems. Jonathan Franzen, 
the American novelist, attributed a similar role to literature, and philosophy is also 
a form of writing. Thus, neither philosophy nor literature would have anything to 
change. Rather, they would have something to preserve. Above all, they have to 
preserve a community of readers and writers who admit to each other that noth-
ing in the world seems simple to them, and who state that “understanding and the 
priorities that govern daily life” are insufficient.
3. EVERYTHING IS DEAD? IS IT THE END OF EVERYTHING? IS EVERY-
THING POST…?
 It is now time to approach the title of my lecture: in a globalized world, are 
there still questions for philosophy of law?
 You who are attending the World Conference today in great numbers may 
rest assured. I will not answer that question negatively, thus forcing us into early 
retirement from an activity we enjoy and that allows us to earn our living honestly 
in the universities in which we work. I say honestly, although I feel haunted by 
Joan Robinson’s ironic comment to her students at Cambridge after a lifetime 
dedicated to teaching. “We would like to prove,” she said, “that we earn our living 
honestly, but I often doubt whether that is true.” This is due to the way our theories 
and mental constructions constantly fade away. That is another effect of the rapid 
social, economic, political and institutional transformations of our contemporary 
world.
 I will not add my voice to the mournful choir that recently seems to be inter-
ested in decreeing the end or the death of almost everything: the end of history, 
the end of humankind, the death of God, the end of reason, the death of ideologies, 
the end of enlightenment, the end of certitudes, the end of modernity, the end of 
utopias, the end of nostalgia, the end of philosophy and —why not?— the end 
of the philosophy of law. Too many endings, I think. Too many deaths. Too many 
funeral processions following urns containing we know not what, or whether their 
occupants are really dead, only cold, or seized by a sudden attack of catalepsy. A 
sudden and suspicious attack of catalepsy, we could add, because we cannot rule 
out that there may be some people who are interested in bringing about such an 
attack.
 The end of modernity is proclaimed every now and then. Then we must face 
the issue of giving a name to our times. Of course, we come up with the easiest, 
less eloquent and imaginative name, the poorest one of all. It is also the most 
successful one —post modernity— the equivalent to admitting that we do not 
know where we stand, except that is comes after modernity. After modernity? If I 
remember rightly, the program for modernity consisted of reason and rights. Thus, 
if it is a matter of reason and rights, it would appear that modernity still has a 
long way to go. Reason, as the faculty that will allow us to pose and resolve the 
way we are to live with each other in diversity and build a more decent society 
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than that which we have achieved so far. Rights, as the individual prerogatives to 
which all humankind aspires without exception. In other words, rights that are, 
at the same time, both individual and universal rights that promote what Alain 
Touraine called “universal individualism”.
 It is in these terms that I would raise the issue of the migratory process that 
characterize our times, for instance. They defy law and the philosophy of law, 
and they are of a very different nature from the migratory processes occurring 
at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. As Anthony Giddens 
postulates, the debate on immigration should be linked to the debate on citizen-
ship. This implies that if immigrants are to enjoy the same rights as local citizens, 
they should also accept a series of specific duties or obligations.
 The end of utopias is also announced all the time, that is, the ability to imagine 
better worlds than our current world. The end of nostalgia is carelessly added on, 
i.e. to cease to value good things from the past. I wonder whether we can accept 
a thing like that so easily and whether we should react against anyone who tells 
us that we already have the best worlds, that there is no use in looking back or 
even in imagining something better than what we have already.
 Think of Fukuyama’s same thesis on the end of history, although we know 
that some years later, in another book, he also decreed the end of humankind. 
Of course, Fukuyama’s thesis says nothing about the end of history as a sudden 
interruption of human events, or the end of history as a study, reconstruction, 
interpretation and search for a probable meaning for past events. No. Fukuyama’s 
thesis, as we all know, is related to the high level of consensus we have attained 
on the legitimacy of democracy as a form of government, and on how the market 
economy is more effective for economic growth and people’s prosperity.
 Fukuyama’s proposal is that the double triumph of liberalism —on the political 
plane and in the field of economics— puts a sort of “full stop to the ideological 
development of humankind”. Humans would have found the “end form of govern-
ment”, with an inevitable correlate in the economic sphere. Therefore, it means 
the end of history in the sense of an end of ideologies. Better yet, the end of the 
clash between different ideologies, since one of them would have taken over the 
entire field. Currently, no alternative model can really aspire to be accepted and 
applied on a relevant world scale.
 Fukuyama is a conservative author and, at the same time, an enthusiast. He 
is also an intellectual who knows how to pose questions and he values the doubts 
about his thesis. Towards the end of his book, he uses a beautiful and thought-pro-
voking image of a caravan of wagons going towards a promised city of democracy 
and a market economy. He accepts that we cannot know for sure whether the oc-
cupants of the wagons, upon arriving in the Promised Land, will not “take in the 
new landscape at a glance, find it not to their taste, and look forward to another 
and more distant journey”.
 This touch of uncertainty at the end of Fukuyama’s book is not a call to the 
wagons’ occupants to leave the caravan in which one wagon follows the one before 
it and to search for a new route, a new destination. Rather, it is a call to stay in 
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line, even though in the evening, when the travellers stop to rest their horses and 
gather around the fire, they will hear new stories on each others’ lips. These stories 
will differ from the ones they were told by the occupants of the first wagon, that is, 
the wagon of those who are in charge, those who decide the caravan’s course.
 I wonder, then, whether it is not also the role of philosophers, and of philoso-
phers of law, to take their place among the people around the fire to liven their 
conversation, their queries, and their doubts.
 In other words, I wonder whether the philosophy of law in our times could 
contribute towards weaving new stories that would be listened to by humankind. 
Although we march in a single direction, we still retain the ability to stop for a 
moment to think and to converse about our current destination. Dworkin refers to 
a function similar to the philosophy of law at the end of his book “Law’s Empire”. 
Under the title “Law’s Dreams”, he affirms that philosophers of law are “chain 
novelists with epics in mind, imagining the work unfolding through volumes it 
may take generations to write. In that sense each of their dreams is already latent 
in the present law; each dream might be law’s future. But the dreams are com-
petitive, the visions are different, choices must be made”. Of course, the choices 
would not be made by the philosophers of law, but by “statesmen in high judicial 
and legislative office”.
 What we need, then, are more stories, not a single story. This is the same as 
saying that we need many different thoughts, not a single system of thought. We 
need fantasy and imagination. We need more unease and less submissiveness. We 
need a philosophy of law that is less self-referring, less introverted, perhaps less 
incestuous as well. A philosophy of law that will not lose height, but that will 
know how to come down to the concrete issues facing law and the science of 
law. A philosophy of law that will learn from other disciplines but that will not 
embrace them recklessly. An over-estimation of the economic analysis of law, for 
instance, leads to impoverishment. In the same way, in past decades confiding in 
social analysis of law alone and in its ability to bring about social change that 
we thought would be more atractive also led to impoverishment. What we must 
avoid today —as José Eduardo Faria holds— “is the final triumph of imperialism 
of economic theory”, of the “hegemony of a certain economic radicalism over all 
other world visions”. However, currently, to embrace morals or worse yet, moral-
ists, is also the wrong path to take, and may even constitute a full retreat. What I 
mean to say is that today we could be blurring the outlines of the specific nature 
of law, and with it, the role of science and philosophy of law. We may have to 
have recourse to authors such as Kelsen to remind us of that specific nature.
 To call upon Kelsen, for instance —and please forgive me those who would 
like to add him to the list of the dead that we mentioned earlier— not so that he 
will pull the basic norm out of his hat again, but so that he will remind us, among 
other things, that what law has always had in common, from Babylonian times to 
the current day, is that it consists in a technique that uses norms and other standards 
to obtain certain desirable social aims that have the particularity of being coercive, 
that is, that they can be imposed by the legitimate use of socially organized force. 
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To call upon Kelsen, but also upon Thomasius and Kant —dead as well?— so 
they will remind us of the distinction between law and morality. Distinction, not 
division. To distinguish is not the same as to divide. To distinguish is to perceive 
and evidence the difference between one thing and another —in this case, between 
law and morality— whereas to divide consists in deliberately putting distance 
between two things. The science of law, the theory of law, the philosophy of law 
should collaborate with other disciplines and knowledge. However, to collaborate 
is not to capitulate. It is not a matter of erecting barriers, or of ignoring bound-
aries and believing that everything is equal. As Argentinean penologist Eugenio 
Raúl Zaffaroni writes on Martin Buner’s brilliant sentence —human beings are not 
rational, although they can become so— “when the ought is confused with the is, 
it detracts from rationalist idealism to the point of becoming radical irrationalism. 
There can be no worse irrationalism than to take human rationality for granted, 
with the resulting destruction of any incentive to fight for it, since it is not a fight 
to attain a natural fact”.
4. MONDIALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION, AND GLOBALIZATION: 
ARE WE REFERRING TO THE SAME THING?
 I am afraid that so far I have only stated the obvious and that some of you 
may wish to hear no more and leave to have a coffee. However, give me one more 
opportunity to go back to the title of my lecture.
 The title suggests, first of all, that philosophy of law poses questions. This, I 
imagine, we can all accept quite readily. As far as questions are concerned, phi-
losophy of law is also derived from general philosophy. Whether you look at it 
as an activity, a discipline or a simple course for our students, philosophy poses 
questions. Furthermore, as Isaiah Berlin says, philosophy discovers its subject at 
the moment it identifies the questions for which it becomes a discipline in order 
to provide an answer. On the other hand, the questions posed by philosophy are 
strange. They are born of that affective excitement that we call amazement. They 
are questions that plunge us into a deep perplexity. Questions, says Berlin, for 
which we do not know where to search for answers.
 This characteristic of philosophy —not knowing where to look for the an-
swers— has from ancient times been related to the idea of a journey. Croesus 
greeted Solon with the words, “We have heard much of thy wisdom and of thy 
travels through many lands, from love of knowledge and a wish to see the world.” 
“To know that one is searching”, said Aristotle of philosophy. “Philosophers seek 
like those who have found nothing, and they find like those who know that they 
must continue to seek”, thought Saint Agustine. “Knowledge in progress”, held 
Xavier Zubiri. “To embark upon the unknown”, believed Ortega.
 In my opinion, “The Sheltering Sky” is Paul Bowles’ best novel. It gave rise 
to a film that can still be seen on satellite television occasionally. In his novel, 
Bowles narrates the adventures of a couple who venture into the desert. They 
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take increasingly dangerous risks and their only aim is to advance, without even 
thinking of returning to their point of departure. The story allows Bowles to draw 
a distinction between travellers and tourists.
 “Whereas the tourist generally is in a hurry to return home after a few months 
or weeks”, writes Bowles, “a traveler, who does not belong more to one place than 
to another, moves slowly from one point of Earth to another”. In other words, a 
tourist comes and goes, and in going, he is already thinking of the return. By con-
trast, travelers press forward. They do not retrace their steps. They concentrate on 
the next stop on the way and, as occurs with the main characters in “The Sheltering 
Sky”, they put much more into the journey than the time they take to make it.
 Tourists not only have a return ticket. They also confirm it from time to time 
and dream of their return. Travelers, by contrast, embark without a return ticket 
and they use all of their resources in continuing their journey rather than arrang-
ing to return home.
 As stated by another contemporary novelist —Paul Auster—, when you see a 
caravan in the desert, what is interesting is how it moves, not how many camels 
and camel drivers it has, or even where it is headed. Likewise, when we think and 
write, what matters is not the finished book, but the writing’s itinerary.
 Philosophy, and that region of philosophy we call legal philosophy, is pure 
movement, and the harbours where it puts in time and again, are never the final 
destination, but just anchorages where it rests and takes on supplies, then to 
resume its voyage. As Karl Jaspers says, “philosophy means to go walking. Its 
questions are more important than its answers, and every answer turns into a new 
question”. 
 Whether we like it or not, that is the way things are in this activity that we 
chose at one point. It consists in always following our path, posing questions. We 
know that if we discover something, it is so that we may continue searching and 
not to declare that we have finished our task.
 The title of my lecture also includes the most popular word in conferences 
and seminars today: “globalization”.
 I shall not attempt to offer the eleventh definition of “globalization”. Perhaps 
we have really come to twelve definitions of it, or perhaps we come back again 
and again to the same confused definition. However, I would like to share some 
brief distinctions in this respect.
 To begin with, as opposed to what happens with old words, “globalization” 
is a term that implores us to give it a meaning, rather than to give fresh meaning 
to a word made stale by routine. To give it a meaning, despite the fact that there 
are thousands of definitions for globalization, so many that such a serious author 
as Alessandro Baricco opted for an inductive solution. That is, he searched for 
examples of globalization since, as he says, “there is no definition for stupidity, 
but there are many instances of it”.
 First, if you allow me, I will make a distinction between mondialization, in-
ternationalization and globalization. The three terms are often used as synonyms, 
that is, as though they refer to exactly the same phenomenon.
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 Mondialization is a process that had to do with discovering and occupying the 
world, the land we live in. It has a territorial and geographical meaning, although 
its political and commercial consequences were very important. It is a process 
that humankind gradually completed. The highlight came with the big 15th century 
discoveries. It is a process that discovers and at the same time erects borders. The 
main characters are well-known national actors.
 Internationalization is a process that comes later, when national states agree 
to inter and supra national authorities that are invested with some degree of in-
terference in the domestic affairs of each state. It is a predominantly political and 
juridical process and, as such, it continues to acknowledge the existence of borders. 
However, it is willing to open them up to the advantage of goals that express and 
at the same time go beyond the private interests of states and other organizations 
partaking in the process.
 Globalization is a more complex and recent process, and therefore is harder to 
define. This is partly because it is unfolding before our very eyes; we are actually 
experiencing it, as so often has been said, with a mixture of fascination and fear. 
However, somehow it has to do with expanding human aspirations and making them 
more uniform. It seeks to replace local lexicons with the acceptance of a common, 
promising destiny that would be supported by a new dramatic interpretation of the 
world, in which the actors multiply and become diversified to the point of turning 
the states into one more actor in the play. It is too soon to know whether that play 
is a comedy, drama or tragedy. Probably globalization, as Guy Sorman has said, 
is not a process that substitutes local loyalties for planetary loyalties, but rather 
a process of “expanding” our local loyalties to more planetary loyalties. In other 
words —coming now from David Held— it would consist in “communities with 
overlapping destinies”, in which “daily life —work, money, beliefs, commerce, 
communications, entertainment, finances and the environment will connect us to 
each other in a way that is ever more intense”.
 Thus, globalization, compared to its immediate predecessors —mondialization 
and internationalization— is a process with broader cultural implications. Where 
mondialization discovered and placed borders, and internationalization opened up 
those same borders, globalization is the equivalent of suppressing borders. Little 
local herds of humans are inserted into a huge planetary herd that suddenly seems 
to be headed in a single direction. With mondialization, that which is far away 
simply appears or is shown to us. With internationalization, that which is distant 
seems closer, whereas with globalization, what was once distant now seems identi-
cal. Mondialization was the result of actions; internationalization, and particularly 
globalization, is the outcome of interactions. These interactions are restricted in 
the case of internationalization and far broader, more complex and uncontrolled 
in globalization. It comes to the point where the interactions of globalization now 
bestow a practical and tangible significance to the hackneyed image of the butterfly 
that beats its wings in India and causes a storm in the Caribbean.
 In the Caribbean? We really do not know. One of the characteristics of glo-
balization, as opposed to universalization, is that it leads to effects that are less 
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controlled, more unexpected or even unwanted. Globalization is not something that 
we all do together, not even governments or the big multinational companies. To 
a certain degree, it is something that happens to us. As Bauman says, no one is 
actually in control and no one is even in a position to exert control. It is more a 
matter of effects than of conscious initiatives and planned undertakings.
 Octavio Ianni, highlighting globalization’s broader cultural nature, writes that 
“since capitalism developed in Europe, it has always had international, multina-
tional, transnational, and world connotations that developed within the original 
accumulation of mercantilism, colonialism, imperialism, dependence and inter-de-
pendence. However, it is undeniable that the discovery that the Earth is no longer 
an astronomic figure, although it is a historic figure, it moves us to new ways of 
being, thinking and creating fables”.
 As a process, globalization can sometimes have a contrary effect to what one 
would expect. By this I mean that sometimes, instead of doing away with local-
isms, it allows them to stand out all the more clearly. “Globalisation is always 
accompanied by localization”, says Chilean sociologist Jorge Larraín, in such a 
way that the two phenomena are far from being “mutually excluding”. However, 
problems arise when globalization, due to the fear it produces, exacerbates local-
isms, particularisms, and outright pernicious nationalisms. I am saying this in 
Spain, a country that is very dear to me, where nationalisms are so important. Quite 
frankly, when nationalisms become aggressive, they make me feel embarrassed. 
Lech Valesa once said that “the cure for nationalism is to travel”. “No one is an 
alien”, Bobbio reminds us, citing John Paul II, probably the only thought of that 
Pope with which Bobbio could agree. Globalization, therefore, while seemingly 
going in the opposite direction, has the virtue of making the profound diversity of 
humankind apparent to all. This is an asset. It is an asset, of course, on condition 
that communities do not entrench themselves in their so-called identities in the 
name of diversity, resisting dialogue and trust with other communities. It appears 
to be convenient to go from multiculturalism to interculturalism, from the mere 
existence of diverse cultures to their coexistence. In other words, we should real-
ize that cultures live with each other and, increasingly, some cultures live among 
others.
 What can I say? To me it seems that the word “identity” is too strong to be 
applied to a country or a continent. It is strong enough when applied to individu-
als, since anyone who has a modicum of complexity always has more than a single 
personality. In fact, taken individually, we are a “trunk full of people”, as Antonio 
Tabucchi says in one of his essays on the work of the Portuguese writer, Fernando 
Pessoa.
 At least for me, an optimistic vision of globalization, then, should lead to an 
encounter between all cultures and real miscegenation. Not to the hegemony of 
one culture over the rest, or a better identification of the diverse cultures, but to 
miscegenation, a crossbreeding, a mixture of all cultures. Naturally, it should lead 
to the end of all localized fundamentalism. It should go beyond, and put an end 
to purity. Nevertheless, that statement is merely a wish. Today, no one can assert 
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for sure whether globalization will end up forcing each culture into a disturbing 
defensive withdrawal, a happy mixing of all cultures, or the impoverishing hege-
mony of one culture over all the rest. It could also be that, in the end, we might 
end up with a little bit of everything at the same time.
 Now you can witness how I add my own dead to the list of the deceased that 
I criticized earlier in my lecture. “The end of local fundamentalisms”, “the end 
of purities”. However, these are mere wishes that sound to me like good wishes. 
Diversity, which is a good thing, should not be a shield behind which nations 
seek shelter to speak in the name of a highly arguable identity. An identity that 
belongs to them like a hallmark that they are not willing to modify in the slight-
est. As Claudio Oliva wrote in Valparaiso, we are witnessing a widespread use of 
public institutions based on the value of individual liberties, democracy, a market 
economy, and ethic and cultural pluralism. The result is that we not only have a 
“plural world”, but also “plural societies”.
 In Latin America, for instance, we have always been obsessed with finding an 
identity for ourselves, instead of exploring our diversity. To cite Mexican writer 
Carlos Fuentes, speaking last year in Chile, “in the very dawn of our Latin Ameri-
can culture, the Peruvian chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega, an Inca who was born 
of a native mother and a Spanish conquistador, said, “World, there is only one”.
 Therefore, I believe that this is not the right time to defend social classes, 
communities, groups, and identities, but rights. Today is still the time to defend 
rights.
5. COSMOPOLITISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM
 The title of my lecture also presupposes that globalization queries the phi-
losophy of law. A substantial part of my exposition should consist in identifying 
those queries and, as far as possible, in answering them. Nevertheless, I hardly 
feel able to point to a few of the questions and perhaps to some of the answers. 
In fact, I have already anticipated more than one question and some of the more 
reasonable answers.
 The next issue is how we should collaborate to prevent globalization from 
becoming not only a process that is happening as we watch in fear or joy, but also 
a phenomenon that we should guide in some way. By guide, I mean to regulate. 
Some goods are of global interest, such as the environment, for instance, but also 
the financial health of nations, since a crisis in any one nation causes greater or 
lesser crises in other nations. Peace is a paramount good. How can we preserve 
these common goods so they will be available to more than just the more powerful 
nations?
 First of all, we should refer to peace, to the relative peace provided by justice. 
Relative peace is always better than the war of all against all or the principle of 
might is right. I think we should think of Bobbio and his proposal of institutional 
pacifism, a pacifism that Bobbio admits to have taken from Kelsen. He developed 
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it in a conversation on Kelsen’s ideas on international law that the master from 
Turin had with Danilo Zolo in 1977.
 In that conversation, Bobbio declared that he owed the idea of the supremacy 
of international law over domestic or national laws to Kelsen, as well as the expec-
tation —which many may consider a utopia— of forming a sort of federal State 
of worldwide dimensions. Emulating national states, this federal state might one 
day manage to monopolize the use of force in an international context.
 Bobbio believes that peace, not justice, is the main purpose of law. Only a 
rapid development of international law can ensure stable and global peace. It is the 
only way to make supranational legal institutions, rather than mere international 
institutions, work more effectively. Thus, the philosophy of law, in the words of 
José Eduardo Faria, must draw our attention to the fact that law is a privileged 
instrument that can stop the “underlying war of the state of nature and strengthen 
the civil peace that characterizes the rule of law”.
 No one should be surprised that a pacifist like Bobbio should trust what he calls 
“institutional pacifism” more than other forms of pacifism, particularly “instrumental 
pacifism” and “ideological pacifism”. To Bobbio, “instrumental pacifism” procures 
peace through the intervention of means, such as bringing about disarmament or, 
at least, controls over the production, sale, possession and use of armament. “Ideo-
logical pacifism”, on the other hand, is inspired by ethics and religion. It aims to 
convert humankind to the virtue of peacefulness through a constant invocation of 
higher values, and by providing people with a moral and civic education.
 As for “institutional pacifism”, it is the one that aims at achieving peace 
through the supranational development of present international institutions. Bob-
bio, as you know, clarifies that the argument underlying his position is clearly 
Hobbesian. It is as simple as warning that just as men in a state of nature first 
had to collectively renounce the individual use of force and then allocate it to a 
single power holding the monopoly of force —the State— so too states, which 
today live in a situation of mutual fear, must effect a similar transition. They must, 
by limiting their sovereignty, constitute supranational organs exercising the same 
monopoly of force.
 We are far from having a world or universal State. We are even at low levels 
of so-called ideological pacifism, particularly when cities such as New York and 
Washington are attacked in the name of God —whoever you may construe Him 
to be— and then the President of the United States retaliates against what he 
calls the “Axis of Evil”. He declares in front of the television cameras that divine 
inspiration led him to abandon a bar in Texas some years ago, to stop drinking 
and to prepare himself to become the next President of his country and the sav-
ior of world democracy. I mention this in an aside because divine justifications 
of this nature, from one side and the other, of deliberate acts of destruction and 
elimination of human beings, strikes me as the most grotesque, scandalous, and 
unacceptable aspect of the present world situation.
 A present situation that is far removed from a universal State. Far indeed. 
The tendency in the long run, in the very long run, seems to go in the direction 
IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD, ARE THERE STILL QUESTIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY OF LAW? 541
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez, 39 (2005), 529-550.
that Bobbio pointed to with the assistance of Kelsen. That is, to pacifism based 
on supranational legal institutions and not on arms control or mere moral and re-
ligious sermons. A cosmopolitan pacifism, if you will, based on the Kantian idea 
of cosmopolitan law, according to which all men and women are world citizens. 
A pacifism that does not replace local loyalties with global loyalties. Rather, it 
broadens our local loyalties by acknowledging loyalties on a broader, global scale. 
It is a pacifism that Bobbio believed in with enthusiasm, to the point of adopting 
John Paul II’s thoughts, as we remembered a while ago.
 In his conversation with Danilo Zolo, Bobbio states that is not easy to under-
stand how, if the sovereignty of the national Leviathans is suppressed, the despotic 
sovereignty of the Leviathan will not reappear in the guise of the universal state 
combining within it the totality of international power, previously diffused and 
dispersed in thousands of rivulets. And this Leviathan, says Zolo, “would obviously 
be incarnated in a restricted ‘directoire’ of economic and military superpowers”. 
In another text of his, Danilo Zolo sustains that the juridical globalism of authors 
such as Kant, Kelsen and Habermas stems from a “far from innocent” premise, 
namely, the analogy between a nation-state’s domestic “civil society” and the so-
called contemporary “global society”.
 Danilo Zolo’s approach is similar to one I heard last year in Chile from Gianni 
Vattimo, who said the following about the challenge of organizing the use of force 
legally, whether in a national or an international context: “In a conversation with 
Charles Taylor in 2001, I was convinced that participation in the European Union 
was a step towards achieving a more democratic UN. Now, in view of what is 
happening with Bush, I realize that it might be better, and more realistic, to think 
of a multi-polar world, for if there is no balance of power, any world order could 
turn into an authoritarian order”.
 In the light of these observations, however, I would follow Bobbio’s lead and 
continue to declare myself an “unrepentant cosmopolitan”. From my position in 
the philosophy of law, I would increasingly base my work to promote pacifism 
on supranational political and juridical institutions. Come what may, as Giddens 
says, “the clash between cosmopolitism and fundamentalism is one of the defining 
characteristics of our time”.
 In short, philosophy of law could help to prevent a return of international 
politics to a Hobbesian situation of war of all against all, encouraged by the 
doctrine of unilateral, preventive war that the United States applied against Iraq. 
What I suggest is —and in this I follow David Held— “a global security agenda” 
that will demand three things of governments and international institutions: first, 
there should be a commitment to international rule of law and the development 
of multilateral institutions. Second, a sustained effort should be made to gener-
ate global forms of political legitimacy for international institutions in charge of 
security and peace. Thirdly, the issues of justice and ethics posed by the global 
polarization of wealth need to be more explicitly acknowledged.
 The third component of this new global security agenda has to do with a more 
effective execution of economic, social and cultural rights. If Bobbio was right 
542 AGUSTÍN SQUELLA
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez, 39 (2005), 529-550.
when he baptized the present as the “time of rights”, it was only in relation to 
personal rights and political rights based on the value of liberty, not in relation to 
economic, social and cultural rights based on the values of equality and solidarity. 
Decent society is not only a society of freedoms but also one in which the differ-
ences in people’s material lives are not too pronounced. In a decent society, people 
eat three times a day. A decent society is based on a society in which men and 
women are equal and free. Therefore, how can those who live in extreme poverty 
find any sense in having and exercising freedoms?
 The paradox seems to be this. We could, in the long term, march towards a sort 
of world state. However, national states, which are essential to the proper realiza-
tion of economic, social and cultural rights, grant ever more space to capital and 
to financial and business conglomerates that are moved only by their own interest 
and profit. They delegate public authority to the private world, which weakens the 
kinds of rights we have mentioned. As José Eduardo Faria asks in that respect, 
“How can we mend the state’s leading role to ensure citizen’s participation in the 
formulation, implementation and execution of macro-economic policy?” In other 
words, what good can representative democracy do for us today, if key decisions, 
those that affect people most directly, are made in the centers of economic and 
financial power and not in the government and the parliament elected by the 
people? In the words of Martin Hopenhayn, “who can ordinary citizens turn to 
in order to claim social rights that have been suddenly diminished by a financial 
event occurring very far away from the country they live in, that seem very dif-
fused, and over which neither they nor their country has any control?” It is not a 
matter of exaggerating, but Gurutz Jáuregui is on the right track when he writes 
that “the absence of politics is allowing big multi-national companies to carry out, 
in practice, a real take-over of power, and real control over the world regardless 
of politics. Under the veil of supposed economic rationality and in the guise of 
a non-political nature, they are developing, in practice, a new kind of politics, 
what we could call parapolitics. This activity, generated from above, is allow-
ing multi-national corporations to occupy society’s vital material centers in an 
imperceptible way, without revolutions, changes of laws or Constitutions and by 
means of the simple development of everyday life. All of that, while avoiding the 
political system —government, parliament, public opinion, judges, and so on”.
 Aldo Ferrer is right, then, when he reminds us in his “History of Globaliza-
tion” that “the past is a never-ending source of lessons for understanding the 
present issues of the internationalization of production and financial globalization. 
However, the past teaches us little about the worldwide dimension of two issues 
of key importance: how to approach the issues of poverty and aggression against 
ecosystems”.
 Today, economic, social and cultural rights go against the current. However, 
they run an even greater risk: that of walking on water or defying the law of grav-
ity. These are expensive rights, no doubt. They are rights that cost money, a lot 
of money. Nonetheless, that does not give a right to call them “Letters to Santa 
Claus” as the representative of the government of the United States did before 
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the United Nations a few years ago. It is not, however, merely a matter of money. 
It is also a matter of indifference. The indifference of the rich towards the poor 
and of rich countries towards poor nations. As Ernst Tugendhat wrote, “Indiffer-
ence is not an illness as obvious as aggressive nationalism. On the contrary, it is 
a peaceful way of annihilating others”.
6. ARE POSITIVISM AND JUSNATURALISM BEING TONED DOWN?
 Currently, among all of the things that are becoming, or seem to be going 
global, is the morality of the more civilized countries also becoming global? Is 
it the morality that, through its increasing incorporation into law, seems to be 
playing an important and new role in the identification and the content of what 
we call the legal system? I do not know whether this is the best way to present 
it, so let us try another way: are human rights becoming global —all of them? 
Human rights understood as a set of heterogeneous and important rights in the 
subjective sense, of values, principles and even simple collective aspirations of 
humanity as a whole. It would seem to be so and therefore we are faced with the 
problem of taking this phenomenon seriously. At least, those of us who subscribe 
to a positivist concept of law must take it seriously.
 In other words, take a relationship between law and morality that is not nec-
essary but contingent —as legal positivism asserts— and that suddenly becomes 
reinforced as a tendency, particularly at the level of constitutional rights in many 
legal systems. Would it not force us to change our qualification of that relationship 
as “contingent”, and replace it by the word “necessary”? This may be another key 
question that globalization puts to the philosophy of law.
 Judging by the several recent publications on the issue, legal positivism ap-
pears to be dead as well. Dead or, at least, it is experiencing serious difficulties 
to remain standing. Dead or very ill, because if you read a recent work by Luis 
Manuel Sánchez Fernández on the issue, all that is left of legal positivism is 
“irony, fallacy, perversion and enigmas”. In other words, it is the equivalent of 
being dead. Not dead at the hands of jusnaturalism —its classic rival— but as 
the consequence of doctrines arising often enough from within legal positivism 
as such. Or dead at the hands of a new jusnaturalism that, rather elegantly, or 
perhaps only astutely, prefers not to assume the condition of such. This is because, 
as Eduardo Barbarosch realized, “the debate between the different meanings of 
legal positivism carries the implication of an underlying attack by jusnaturalism, 
in its contemporary form, for the purpose of undermining, once and for all, any 
position that could invoke a positivist approach to law”.
 Legal positivism, then, is dead. It is dead due to doctrines that consider the 
positivist thesis of the distinction between law and morality, between the law that 
is and the law that, from any moral point of view, ought to be, to have been a 
failure. Legal positivism is dead —thereby adding to the list of funerals that we 
mentioned at the beginning of our lecture— or perhaps terminally ill due to those 
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who, faced with law’s constant incorporation of moral content, prefer to seek refuge 
in an inclusive legal positivism. Inclusive legal positivism is a name that adds a 
second, new adjective to the term “positivism”.
 We should be careful of adjectives, for they often empty the noun they ac-
company of all content. That is what has happened to the word “democracy”, for 
instance. As Ross warned at one point, democracy loses almost all of its signifi-
cance when the adjectives “real”, “organic”, “protected” and “popular” are added 
to it. 
 To say “legal positivism” rather than only positivism is correct. Legal posi-
tivism is not the same as Comte’s positivism, nor is it a derivation of that, or 
a simple application of philosophical positivism to the field of law. This was 
very well explained at one point by Antonio Hernández Gil, to whom, if only in 
passing, I would like to pay homage. However, expressions which add another 
adjective, such as “inclusive legal positivism” and “soft legal positivism” are 
due to defensive positions that legal positivism has assumed as a result of the 
incorporation of moral criteria to law. In fact, this is not a new phenomenon, to 
which I believe legal positivism is in a position to respond without the need for 
committing itself to new adjectives such as “soft”, “inclusive”, “moderate”. I say 
it is not a new phenomenon because forty years ago, when I was a student of 
law, I suddenly encountered expressions such as “good faith”, “good customs”, 
“good family man” and so on in my country’s Civil Code, as no doubt happened 
to you as well.
 It would seem that lately positivists have developed the inferiority complex 
mentioned by Rafael Escudero Alday in his recent and excellent book on the subject. 
In any case, it would be more appropriate to refer to a bad conscience, particularly 
when it comes to ideological legal positivism —which practically no positivist 
has ever accepted— and, of course, to some of the thesis on legal positivism as 
a theory, to continue in the use of Bobbio’s expressions. Notwithstanding, I see 
no reason for legal positivism to develop a bad conscience or even an inferiority 
complex, in its methodological version or model. The model asserts that we can 
identify law —for the purpose of study, not to approve or disapprove it— while 
abstaining from value judgments stemming from moral convictions. That is the 
only way to respect law’s specificity and, above all, to protect the specificity of 
morality —whether critical, social or personal— as a point of reference from which 
to judge the correctness or incorrectness of any particular law. And to justify, in 
a given case, disobedience to it.
 In other words, there are legal reasons to continue to be positivists from the 
methodological point of view, although there are also powerful moral reasons. 
The less law and morality are distinguished and the more they are confused, the 
more difficult jurists’ task becomes. That is, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
describe and also to value current law. As a result, what legal positivism requires 
of us is not an abdication of values, that is, a surrender of moral values, but 
rather, an abstention from evaluating. Momentarily, we should put values within 
parenthesis, so we can identify and describe law as what it actually is. Later, we 
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can use values to state whether the existing law is also what it ought to be. To 
put it differently, if the thesis of methodological legal positivism was ever divided 
into two assertions —one, the distinction between the law that is and the law that 
ought to be and two, the assertion that jurists should only deal with the law that 
is— it would mean that only the first assertion should remain.
 Abstaining from the evaluation mentioned above refers to the method of 
knowledge, not to the object to be known. That is, it is a characteristic of the 
science of law, not of law, because law always evidences itself in many norms, 
principles and moral values that dominate at any given moment. This characteris-
tic, moreover, does not prevent, but quite the contrary, it makes a moral criticism 
of any given law much easier. Even Kelsen clearly perceived the latter. And two 
centuries before him, Kant, when he said that “we should restrict the science of 
law to make room for morality”.
 It is a fact that a growing number of principles, values, criteria, references, and 
expressions of morality are being incorporated into the constitution and laws. I am 
thinking of “liberty”, “equality”, “pluralism”, “solidarity”, “dignity”, “non-discrimi-
nation” and so on. They need to be given content and to be taken into account by 
the legal operators who must apply them when the time comes to make new norms 
for the legal system within the framework of the norms that include terms such as 
those which are mentioned above. Nonetheless, it is hardly a novelty that making 
new norms —on the part of legislators, for instance— requires the application of 
a formal and a material framework and that this normally establishes a norm of 
a higher category, in this case, the constitution. The constitution, like any higher 
norm in relation to the lower norm whose production it regulates, establishes not 
only by whom and how the lower norm can be created (what we call the “formal 
framework”), but also certain limits to the content that the body that creates the 
lower norm must respect (what we call the “material framework”). In consequence, 
it is hardly new that in order to decide upon the existence or validity of a legal 
norm, we must carefully study its origin or pedigree, and also its content. When 
a lower norm violates the limits of the content assigned to it by the higher norm, 
it could be said that the lower norm can be annulled through appeals that can be 
maintained before the appropriate body.
 Thus, the novelty does not consist in the fact that content-related aspects are 
involved in our technical judgment of the validity or existence of legal rules, but 
rather in the fact that moral principles, criteria and references increasingly prolifer-
ate among such content-related aspects. Without losing their moral character, they 
become part of law, that is, they become positivized. They also pose a challenge 
to whoever must interpret and apply them —a judge, for instance— that all legal 
operators must face when it comes to legal rules: they must establish the field of 
the possible meanings and the scope of those moral standards and decide which 
of them seems to be the more appropriate one for the case concerned.
 It is true that when it comes to the principles and moral values that a legal 
operator should apply, the framework of possible interpretations is broader than 
when it is a matter of interpreting and applying an ordinary legal rule, for instance, 
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a rule that establishes the time limit for making an appeal. However, in essence, 
the task is the same: to make law within a formal and material framework that has 
been established by one or more rules of a higher order. The situation should not 
vary from a qualitative standpoint, because moral principles, values, and references 
are presented within that material framework. Those principles, values and refer-
ences have become part of law, in the sense that they have become incorporated 
into law by the decision of a higher legal operator, but they do not change the 
nature of positive law. Nor should it be construed that they dissolve morality into 
law, and even less that they dissolve law into morality.
 What I mean to say is this: the material framework for creating a legal rule 
may include moral values and principles that have been made positive by law 
itself and by virtue of deliberate acts on the part of other regulation authorities. 
However, if those values and principles cause an obligation upon other regulating 
authorities, it is not due to their moral character, but because they have been in-
corporated into law and are part of it. Furthermore, the requirement of abstaining 
from evaluation is not a barrier to identifying specifically moral content within the 
material framework that must be taken into account in the operations of making, 
interpreting and applying law, since in that case it is law itself that has established 
the way things should be, through one of its operators and making use of its own 
sources.
 It is true that by incorporating values and moral principles into law diminishes 
legal certainty, because they are very broad and relatively vague. Legal certainty 
is characteristic of law, that is, it is a typically legal value. However, the degree 
to which legal systems realize such a value (providing that it is data that legal 
positivism is able to register and explain) does not deny the theory’s ability to 
describe law. As Luis Prieto Sanchís pointed out, the fact that there is room for 
moral principles and values in the way legal positivism explains the legal phe-
nomenon represents a datum that legal positivism itself can observe without need 
for correction.
 As a result, legal positivism’s central thesis still stands: law is different from 
morality. Any relationship between them is contingent rather than necessary. Law, 
insofar as it is a specific normative order, does not depend on moral criteria to 
be identified.
 I am not sure whether the example I will now give you is particularly appro-
priate or even worthy of a plenary session in a world conference on the philoso-
phy of law, but I cannot resist the temptation of making it. If the “Real Madrid” 
football club were strengthened by two or three top players from the “Barcelona” 
club to play a friendly international match —a hypothesis that will never occur, 
as supporters of both teams know very well— the team that went out on the pitch 
that day would still be “Real Madrid”. The two or three temporary players from 
“Barcelona” would still belong to the Catalonian club, although they would be 
wearing the Madrid team’s white kit and not their own blue and red.
 Likewise, I am not sure whether my thoughts on this issue bring me closer 
to an inclusive or an exclusive legal positivism. All I would like to say is that 
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it is perfectly possible to remain faithful to the thesis of methodological legal 
positivism simply because it can provide a better description of reality and the 
specificity of the cultural phenomenon that we call law. The value of a theory lies 
with its descriptive ability, and not with how usefully it can solve our practical 
problems, and even less in its ability to respond to our wishes for a better world. 
That is why I have never been able to agree with our dear and remembered friend, 
Albert Calsamiglia. In his article “Post-positivism”, he criticizes legal positivism 
because “it is curious that when we are most in need of guidance, the positivist 
theory remains silent”. I would say that legal positivism does not remain silent, 
although it is also not its place to tell us how to resolve the difficult cases that 
a judge might face. Theories do not prescribe. They describe. They are only ac-
countable for a poor description, and not for failing to tell us what we expected 
to hear.
 In a certain sense, legal positivism has always been inclusive, since positive law 
is inclusive. Positive law includes moral values and principles, and legal positivism 
could be “inclusive” insofar as it explains that fact, but not so far as to give up 
its core thesis: the distinction between law and morality. That is the fundamental 
issue of our debate, that is, the distinction and, at the same time, the relationship 
between law and morality. It is not without reason that Ihering referred to this issue 
as legal philosophy’s Cape Horn. For those who do not know that southernmost 
geographical point on our planet, I will explain that the sea is always very rough 
and stormy at Cape Horn, making navigation difficult and risky. It is very easy 
to be shipwrecked there, that is, to get lost, to succumb, to have a bad experience 
during our passage. It is akin to what could happen when we make philosophy, 
which for some reason has been compared with a journey since ancient times, as 
we saw earlier in this lecture.
 Equally, I am not sure whether currently legal positivism is becoming seg-
mented or refined. Perhaps it is a club in which discussions and divisions among 
members began some time ago. In any case, internal discussions are good, insofar 
as they allow legal positivism to polish its arguments without abandoning its core 
thesis —the differentiation between law and morality— or the thesis of the origin 
of law in sources of production thus invested by law itself, nor finally, the possibil-
ity of objectively identifying both the sources of legal production and the product 
of putting those sources into action. Or perhaps what is softened and refined is 
jusnaturalism, whose supporters understand, at last, that what they call “natural 
law” is no more than a set of moral convictions that, to really become law, have to 
become part of what they call “positive law”, an expression that sounds redundant 
to a positivist, insofar as “positive” adds nothing to “law”.
 “Being a positivist is worth the effort” is the last sentence in a very good 
work by Liborio Hierro on this subject. A sentence that I share completely, for 
all the reasons I have given. However, what does he mean here by “effort”? Is 
it punishment, pain, sorrow, or trouble? No, none of these things. “Effort” here 
means “worth your while”. That is, legal positivism makes sense and it is worth 
spending time and effort to explain it to others.
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7. TO OPERATE IN THE FULL LIGHT, AND NOT WILDLY IN THE DARK 
 It is time to conclude. Some of the questions that I believe globalization 
poses to the philosophy of law have appeared during my lecture, probably not in 
as orderly a manner as I would have liked. The extensive reflection on legal posi-
tivism may have been out of proportion, but what can we do: we are prisoners of 
our obsessions. In this case the difference, and at the same time the relationship, 
between law and morality. The subject may be for the experts but, since it has to 
do with people’s freedom, it goes far beyond a specialized field.
 It is not my intention to be provocative just for the fun of it. However, just 
as the oldest and most well-established religions currently seem to give way to 
simpler, more diffuse and light spiritualities —and certainly far less aggressive 
ones— I wonder whether hard core jusnaturalism is giving way to inclusive legal 
positivism, which is also less aggressive, and certainly more refined and elegant 
that traditional jusnaturalism. However, it only barely manages to mask its nos-
talgia for the latter, and the longing to soften the sort of lack of protection in 
which methodological legal positivism as such leaves us. It should not be forgot-
ten that philosophy is also a palliative, a support that compensates our unstable 
environment, a piece of armor with which, as Freud believed, we do not manage 
to protect ourselves entirely from the arrows of fate.
 Whether there are more questions for the philosophy of law or not —and I 
think there are— it is worth our while to continue to dedicate time to it, just as 
scientists devote their time to science and artists to art. It is one of those activi-
ties, as Kolakowski says, through which humans can come to a sort of agreement 
with the world, although we know that such an agreement is impossible. In short, 
it is worth our while to continue making philosophy, and also philosophy of law, 
for the good reason that Isaiah Berlin gave: because philosophy assists men to 
operate in the open, and not wildly in the dark.* 
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